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Although the problem of government effectiveness is (in a broad sense) one of the oldest prob-
lems in political science and political philosophy, at present one is observing its «second birth».  A great 
number of recent published works and even a special academic structure - The Quality of Government 
Institute in Sweden – are the evident signs of the renaissance.  However, we are witnessing serious diffi-
culties on both conceptual and instrumental levels of researching government effectiveness.  In this paper 
we are going to achieve a few goals: 1) to make an observation of existing approaches, accenting their 
weak points; 2) to propose the theoretical frame of government effectiveness analysis with corresponding 
estimation tools;  3) to present some empirical results based on Russian regions data. 
At present we observe, disappointedly, a huge variety of effectiveness estimations, based on 
quite different assumptions.  The trouble here is that those underlying assumptions are not frequently 
recalled by the estimators themselves.  So someone who wants to reconstruct the original way of thinking 
must become a traveling knight, a menestrel, trying to obtain different paths on the long way of the truth. 
Let us try, in some medieval way, to share the knight’s glory.  
The first common way to deal with government effectiveness is to create extremely broad defi-
nitions that require expert estimations as an evaluation tool.  A representative example is the most fre-
quently cited World Bank project “World Governance Indicators»1 (Kaufmann et al. 2010).  Government 
effectiveness (GE) is defined by the authors as “the quality of public services, the quality of the civil ser-
vice and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s сcommitment to such policies» (P.4).  In fact, this 
definition includes a set of various features based on different underlying assumptions about government, 
effectiveness and, finally, politics itself.  Similarly, the measurement of GE is a statistically sophisticated 
process of integrating estimations, made by expert communities all over the world (Freedom House, Ber-
telsmann Institute, Afrobarometer etc.), in a single scale.  
Generally, this approach reflects one major problem of government effectiveness studies: defi-
nition as a set of concomitant features, not necessarily disclosing the essential core of the notion.  Some-
times those features are attributes of effectiveness, the other times – its preconditions or consequences.    
The other widespread approach is to estimate effectiveness using achieved rates of development 
– in economics (e.g.  La Porta et al. 1999) or, occasionally, in quality of life (Huther and Shah 2005).  An 
                                                 
1
 www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance  
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obvious problem here is that economic and social development is affected by a wide variety of factors, 
including available recourses, initial conditions etc.  Formally speaking, the degree of development is a 
function of several variables, only one of which is government effectiveness.  So we have to take into 
consideration all those variables to draw well-grounded conclusions.  Furthermore, we can never be sure 
what is primary: effectiveness or wealth? One can say that rich countries can afford good governance.  
Similar difficulties accompany the definition of effectiveness as a capability of government to sat-
isfy needs and interests of social groups, accented in the theories of new government and new public 
management (Unlocking 2005).  In a broad political sense the indicators of “satisfaction” are election 
results and, more instrumentally, poll data.  However in Russian regions both depend on factors hardly 
connected with government effectiveness: the degree of administrative control over mass-media, density 
and structure of local social networks and, finally, the way of conducting elections or polls.  More gener-
ally, citizen’s perceptions of government and public goods are related to the type of political regime.  
Concurrently, the very vision of government effectiveness as an attribute of “society – state sys-
tem” (not only government itself) is of paramount importance.  Inside this conceptual frame we can 
distinguish several substantive paradigms, considering effectiveness in context of definite characteristics 
of societies and/or society-state interactions.  Among them the issues of political accountability (Adsera et 
al. 2003), the level and structure of social capital (Putnam 1993, Raiser et al. 2007, Delhey and Newton 
2005),  socio-economic differentiations in the society (Easterly and Woolcock 2006), structures of net-
work interactions (Kenis and Provan 2007).  
A few more streams in government effectiveness studies are guided by new institutional paradigm.  
Mentioned above accountability issue is being developed with the analytical tools of principal–agent 
problem (Carrigan and Coglianese 2011).  Another school focuses upon the impact of formal political 
rules (Rogowski, 1987).  And the increasing amount of articles are dealing with “institutional strength” – 
the degree to which government is able to transform written rules into working rules (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2009, Kus 2010).  
Also there are attempts to link effectiveness with some definite type of economic and social poli-
tics, although it is clearly not a mainstream today.  The basic problem here is that successful states of 
modernity demonstrate a very wide spectrum of policies; there can hardly be recognized any all-prize set 
of them (Andrews 2010).  Furthermore, the impact of policy’s content is subject to they way of it is being 
implemented.  So the success of any policy depends on quality of government and there is no practical 
opportunity to define that quality with the help of some certain policy.     
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Drawing a line under this brief (and obviously incomplete) review, I should stress the following.  
First of all, the diversity of approaches to the government effectiveness problem  is not very encompass-
ing.  Almost all of the significant schools in social sciences participate, and all the contributions are to 
some extend valuable.  But various separate features, conditions and consequences of good governance 
don’t make a whole picture, and we still do not have an answer to the question what is government effec-
tiveness.  This problem is rooted in the absence of some “synthetic” model which would be able to glue 
different aspects of the phenomenon.  The basis of such a model, I suggest, must be some intuitively clear 
idea about effectiveness, even if at the outset it won’t be very rich in the sense of political science in gen-
eral and government in particular.  To grope the lines of this model we shall start with one more block of 
effectiveness (or rather efficiency) concepts.  We’ll call them “instrumental” or “technical” because origi-
nally they could be applied to a very broad class of objects: firms, states, regions etc.  Inside the technical 
concept we distinguish three approaches to define effectiveness (and in this – and only in this case they 
are definitions).       
 Correspondence between set goals and achieved result.  It would seem quite a transparent definition 
that gives a clue to quantitative estimation of efficiency.  If the objective value of some parameter X 
is ox , achieved value - ax , rate of efficiency can be defined as a ratio oa xx / .  Regretfully, this won-
derful solution in case of politics appears to be not very helpful.  First, politicians (by obvious rea-
sons) are not fond of formulating goals in a numerical way.  Second, setting goals is a political pro-
cess, involving distribution and exertion of power.  Finally, setting goals itself depends on the quality 
of management, on the organization’s capabilities to analyze and forecast the event’s progress ade-
quately.  
 Organization promotion compliance with established (typically by higher rank state organization) 
standards.  For example, Russian Ministry for Regional Development  (MRD below) measures 
“budget spending inefficiency” as an amount of money (e.g. expended for the needs of healthcare 
system) exceeding RF average rate.  This approach is generically related to the one above: standards 
are worked out inside the state hierarchy.  And that is the root of the major problem: there are too 
strong incentives to establish standards which would be relatively easy to estimate and to achieve.  
 Relationship between results and resources used to provide them.  Such efficiency is sometimes 
called “productivity” and is often considered to be tightly connected with economics.  The last is true 
only in sense that it is more commonly used in economist’s research work in comparison to political 
and sociological studies.  Indeed, it would be correct to call result/resource efficiency a “system effi-
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ciency”, as far as it is build upon key notions of the signal and system theory (e.g. “input”, “output”) 
and uses significant part of it’s mathematical formalism.  
Generalized model of result/resource efficiency includes the following basic elements:  
 Inputs – limited resources, used to obtain definite results.  Studies of government efficiency (see e.g.  
Aubyn 2008) deal with two major types of inputs: monetary (budget expenditures primarily) and 
“physical” (human and capital resources).     
 Outputs – achieved results.  Measuring the outcomes is especially difficult because they rarely fall 
for direct estimation; the task is to find empirical proxies for such phenomena as “quality of 
education” or “national health condition”.  Therefore outcomes are commonly registered in non-
monetary form: life expectancy or infant mortality for healthcare, examination results and 
unemployment indicators of school-leavers for education, crime levels for law enforcement system.     
 Decision-Making Units (DMU) that transform inputs into outputs.  Those could be organizations in a 
narrow sense – schools, hospitals or police departments, or national and regional healthcare and edu-
cation systems, or – at top level - national and regional governments.  On the one hand an important 
feature of DMU is some degree of autonomy in resource allocation decisions and inner institutional 
design (both formal and informal).  Otherwise efficiency estimation task does not make sense, 
because the performance is determined by higher positioned body.  On the other, a certain degree of 
homogeneity is required for DMUs; for example, it is not correct to compare national systems to 
regional.     
In this paper we’ll demonstrate facilities of output/input approach with the help of Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA) – a technique primordially invented to evaluate market firms’ efficiency, but 
recently adopted in governmental cross-national and cross-regional studies.  DEA principles originate in 
the well known concept of Pareto optimality, which presupposes the inability to increase (improve) one 
parameter without decreasing (worsening) the other.  Let us recall classic illustration from microeconom-
ics textbooks (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2003).  In Pareto optimal economy it is impossible to increase the 
output of “butter” without cutting down the output of “cannons”.  At figure 1 a set of non-negative combi-
nations of X and Y (standing for two outputs) is represented.  This set is divided into two subsets by AC 
curve called product-possibility frontier (PPF).  All the pairs {x,y} above PPF are restricted, i.e. could not 
be achieved in the given economical conditions.  All the combinations under PPF are inefficient as they 
allow so called Pareto improvement: raise of one output without reducing the other.  Point B at figure 1 
belongs to inefficient set.  All Pareto optimal combinations are disposed on the curve AC.  
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Figure 1a.  Product-possibility frontier Figure 1b.  Distance to PPF as an efficiency 
metrics 
 
Despite the seeming abstractiveness of this criterion, it at once gives us a clue to efficiency rate 
estimation in the sense of metric function.  For DMUs lying on PPF efficiency rate is equal to 1 (or 100%) 
by definition; for DMUs under the curve efficiency rate is proportional (inversely) to the distance to PPF 
(Figure 1b).      
Remaining in the same conceptual frame we may pass from “output space” to “input-output 
space” (Figure 2).  On the axis of abscisses we put the amount of resource in use; on the axis of ordinates 
we put the quantitative expression of outcome.  Points on the plane stands for various DMUs  (A, B, C, 
D). 
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Figure 2.  DMUs in an “input – output” space 
.    
Similarly to the example above, DMUs В и D at Figure 2 are inefficient as they are able to either 
a) increase output without decreasing input (D→D’) or b) reduce input without diminishing output 
(B→B’).  It is practically important, by the way, to distinguish output-oriented efficiency and input-ori-
ented efficiency.  
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Product-possibility frontier is given by function which could be written as the following:  
)(xFy

 ,           (1) 
where y

 is a vector of results,  x

 - a vector of resources.  Denoting inputs and outputs in vector 
form, we stress the fact that a set of resources could be converted into a set of results   (Figure 3).  If we 
deal with more than one input and/or more than one output, PPF can no longer be represented by curve; it 
would be a surface in three-dimensional or a hypersurface in multidimensional space.  
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  DMU as an input - output converter  
 
Note that PPF is not stationary in long time periods: it changes by technological development, 
institutional and environmental transformations.  For example, if we compare regional education effi-
ciency rates during several years, PPF would be affected, at least, by changes in the quality of federal 
education policy.    
In applied analysis the practical task is to find PPF as a real evaluation tool, not just as an abstract 
mathematical function like (1).  In engineering PPF may by given (at least in theory) in analytical form 
due to the laws of exact sciences; one is able to estimate the units of work that could principally be gener-
ated with the given amount of energy.  For the social sciences this path is, most likely, unavailable: no 
one knows how much health could be “produced” for one dollar or one ruble.  PPF-detecting task is at 
once set in comparative or relative way: the solution would be correct in regard only to the sampled 
DMUs.  In the process of studying US states we’ll get a few with a unit efficiency.  Likewise, measuring 
efficiency in Russia we’ll obtain a number of regions lying on PPF.  But that doesn’t mean that the states 
and regions in question are equally efficient as PPFs would differ.     
One “technical” option regarding PPF is of a high importance in DEA – the choice of the frontier 
type.  The first one presupposes constant returns to scale (CRS), the second - variable returns to scale 
(VRS).  The difference between them is illustrated by schematic two-dimensional example below (Figure 
3).  
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Figure 3.  PPF for CRS (dotted line) and for VRS (firm line). 
 
CRS frontier is a ray originating from point (0,0) and overpassing DMU with maximum produc-
tivity (A).  CRS underlying assumption is that change in input implicates (for efficient DMUs) the propor-
tional change in output, so production amounts hypothetically can be increased infinitely.  VRS frontier is 
a convex polyline connecting points with unit efficiency (A and C).  At Figure 3 the idea of diminishing 
returns is realized, which is most likely in regard to government issues.  It is worthwhile making a remark 
here that values obtained using CRS and VRS frontier are different estimations of efficiency and even 
correlations between them are not strong at all.  That’s why it is necessary to take substantive features of 
analyzed object into consideration before making CRS-VRS choice.    
Besides static DMU’s efficiency evaluations, DEA disposes some tools to work with panel data - 
Malmquist indexes.  Since calculation of those indexes involves cumbersome mathematics (Coelli 2005; 
Fare et al.1997), we’ll limit ourselves to a brief description:    
 EFFCh – efficiency change (CRS), ratio 1tCRS / tCRS .  
 TECh (technical change) – change in product-possibility frontier.  
 TFPCh (total factor productivity change) – estimation of joint effect of efficiency change and frontier 
change (CRS), TFPCh = EFFCh× TECh. 
 PECh (pure efficiency change) – analog of EFFCh for VRS: ratio 1tVRS / tVRS .  
 SECh (scale efficiency change) – change in the return to scale effects: ratio EFFCh/PECh.     
Thus, the fragment above sketches what we consider to be the formal core of any effectiveness 
concept - relation between outputs and inputs.  However, here we are starting to face a problem of “uni-
versality excess”; input-output approach is applicable to all sorts of organizations and by default does not 
have specialized instruments for government effectiveness analysis.  We need something to turn efficiency 
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evaluation into effectiveness evaluation.  As opposed to firm, government is responsible not only for cur-
rent “product” (e.g. resolutions of cases in courts) but for long-run social indicators such as the levels of 
property rights protection, of trust in judicial system, and, generally, of basic support for political system.  
The last mentioned notion we interpret as an aggregated demand rate for state institutions (formal rules) 
and public services (working definition).  Hence we need to introduce into the model some parameters 
representing social support, which is absolutely unnecessary in economic analysis.   
Another difference between firms and governmental or public bodies is related to the tomorrow’s 
input ( 1tX ) dependence upon today’s output ( tY ).  For the company operating in the market environment 
such dependence is obvious (in case of chronic inefficiency at some point of time it would have no 
resources for production).  It is not true with public structures, in the general case at least.  More 
precisely, it not true with the elements of national systems, such as regions or separate sectors of public 
good provision; they can compensate the lack of efficiency by means of budget redistribution on the 
higher hierarchy level (I mean subsidies etc.).  They may even increase input using lobbying strategies; 
furthermore, inefficiency as a decrease of the output indicators may be a great help for struggling for 
additional funding.  Meanwhile, for national systems in long time periods there is an output-input 
connection.    
Besides, state DMUs face strong limitations (of political kind) in managing their inputs.  For exam-
ple, such optimization steps as mass discharges or salary cuts can hardly be made in education or 
healthcare systems.  Limitations of that sort are stipulated by the requirement of current support for politi-
cal system (electoral one primarily).  
Let us emphasize this issue specially.  In political science tradition traced back to Easton’s seminal 
work (Easton 1953) support for political system have always been seen as something homogenous, a 
single variable.  In the terms of system dynamics it can be considered either as a “stock” (S) or as a “flow” 








t
S
, but in any case it is one scalar value.  This approach may be appropriate for the “old 
democracies”, where trust in political institutions (as opposed to certain elites, leaders and policies) is 
high and doesn’t change strongly over time.  In our terms, the basic support is a constant, the current 
support is a variable.  But in autocratic systems or in “democracies with adjectives” this condition is not 
implemented.  That’s why we stress the necessity to distinguish support for “rules of the game” (basic) 
and support for leaders and policies (current or electoral).      
All these specific aspects, we suppose, do not conflict with the input-output model and can be inte-
grated in it.  Although, it requires complication of the model in order to fit political realities better.    
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First, we propose more specified version of model’s outputs:  
 «Technical» outputs – direct results of DMU performance: surgeries, arrests, adjudgements etc.  For-
mally speaking, technical output is generally a vector, and we see three of it’s components:   
o Quantity (of criminals caught or made).  We should notice that the vast majority of published 
studies consider only this component.  
o Quality (true verdicts, well done surgeries, criminals arrested instead of chance passerbies.    
o Costs of receiving public good for the customer – amount of all kinds of resources required to 
gain service.  Partly costs are determined by quantitative component of the outcome, but princi-
pally it is a separate important parameter which affects the rate of basic support for political 
system.   
There are two main sources of costs.  The first one is insufficient provision of DMUs with 
resources that implies shortage of the technical outputs.  The second one is established by DMU  
(formally and informally) system of rules regulating service provision.  It may be constructed in such a 
way that the costs for the society increase artificially in order to stimulate corruption.     
 Social outputs are indicators that represent the condition of the sphere regulated and serviced by the 
state.  Examples are morbidity, mortality and crime rates, degrees of education or levels of right pro-
tection.  One difficulty in regard to social outcomes is their dependence on many factors besides gov-
ernment effectiveness.  For example, in many countries life expectancy strongly correlate with behav-
ioral habits.  Another problem is the time lag in the impact of effectiveness changes on social out-
comes.  Nonetheless, mentioned problems have theoretical and technical solution (not a simple one, 
unfortunately); social outputs should be taken into consideration anyway.  This type of outputs is may 
be the only one connected to the input, forming a feedback in time.  Thus, life span growth reduces 
future expanses for social maintenance and healthcare system, high level of property rights protection 
contributes to the investment attraction, economic development and, after all, tax collection. 
Figure 4 represents graphically some theses adduced above.  
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Diagram at Figure 4 makes sense only as a model (more exactly, sketch of a model) of dynam-
ical system.  Theoretically, all interactions should be considered as functions of time.  Otherwise it is hard 
to detect the major effects, because of the delays in casual links at least.  Correspondingly, we define 
effectiveness of the system as a whole as it’s structural property: it displays in the relations of model 
parameters in time.  This global or system effectiveness is not the same as the efficiency of separate 
DMUs: efficiency is a value but effectiveness is a structure.    
The most important connections in the system are: 
a) Between efficiency rates of DMUs and institutional reforms in case they are being realized.  
Broadly speaking, institutional reforms are nothing but an attempt to tune “the black box” in such a way 
that the returns for a unit of resources would increase.  
It is often possible to represent the course of institutional reform as a quantity.  Thus, already 
mentioned MRD publishes annual information about, for example, “the share of public healthcare enter-
prises transferred to the new emolument system”.  This is the time function, though series are very short 
yet; the same are efficiency rates measured by DEA.  So there exists a practical opportunity to find out if 
there is a positive connection between those processes.    
By the way, MRD itself uses quite another approach to estimate effectiveness of regional 
authorities (see Методика 2010).  Indicators of reform implementation are, so to say, self-sufficient; their 
growth is seen as an evidence of increasing effectiveness regardless to their impact.  Any effects of new 
formal rules are not taken into account; any chances that they are being implemented are welcomed.  No 
Akhremenko - 11 
one seems to comprehend the basical  opportunity of informal institutionalization.  On the contrary, struc-
tural approach that we propose gives an opportunity to trace the turning of written norms into working 
rules,   
b).  Between technical and social outputs or, a bit more intricate, between technical efficiency 
and social effectiveness.  We have to answer the question whether change in technical efficiency corre-
lates with the change in social one.  E.g., does the upturn in the percentage of crime cases solved imply 
the reduction of crime rates? We hypothesize that the absence of such correlation witnesses either low 
quality of services provided or manipulations with the statistical reports. 
c).  Between social effectiveness and support for political system (both current and basic).  As 
in the previous case the absence of connection is an evidence of drawbacks in “system settings” in general 
and high costs of services in particular.   
d).  Past outputs and present-day inputs (feedback loop).  As we stated above, in non-market 
environment this link is not “automatic”, that’s why in Figure 4 we use dotted line to represent it.  Yet in a 
long run the state is not able to maintain normal functioning without the inflow of outer resources that 
does not depend upon system effectiveness (oil market condition as a variant).    
e).  Between current and basic support for political system.  This issue is complicated.  It 
requires separate theoretical considerations and a nonlinear formal model.  In brief, we suppose that the 
gap between these two types of supports is fraught with social shock, provoked by the accumulated pro-
test.  
Consideration of dynamic links named above gives a pass from DMU efficiency evaluation, 
which is important though particular, to the estimation of system’s effectiveness and, after all, sustaina-
bility of it’s development.  
Below we’ll demonstrate some results of the empirical study focused on healthcare efficiency 
and effectiveness in Russian regions.  Before we proceed three remarks should be made.  First, the study 
is of a pilot character and its main purpose is to try methodical tools.  Thus the conclusions regarding 
healthcare system proper are preliminary.  Second, not all the links listed above could be tested because of 
data limitations.  We concentrated on connections between DMU’s efficiency rates and institutional 
reforms (a), technical efficiency and social effectiveness (b), efficiency and effectiveness on the one hand 
and satisfaction of the customers on the other (c, in part
2
).  Third, the time series available are very short, 
so we had to use simple methods such as correlation and OLS regression instead of complex dynamic 
                                                 
2
 We consider the satisfaction of people with public healthcare services as an element of current 
support  
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models.  At the same time we do believe that in a qualitative, raw count sense our conclusions are quite 
correct.  
The sample of regions has been formed in order to achieve at least some degree of homogeneity 
(not a simple task in such a country as RF).  We limited ourselves to the set of territories that are similar 
in transport accessibility (TA) and settlement dispersion (SD)
3
 way.  These two indicators, originally 
calculated by Russian Ministry of Finance
4
, are consolidated in a single “network norms coefficient” 
(NNC) by MRR (Методика 2010):  
NNC=TA×SD, 
This criterion is important because it affects the difference between amounts of input required to 
obtain one unit of output.  Thus, ambulance services are costly in northern Siberian and Far East regions 
in comparison to Central Russia; in the first case one may have to use a helicopter.    
NCCs are higher than 1 in 38 regions where transport accessibility and settlement dispersion are 
significantly over Russian average level.  Remnant 45 territories with NCC unit value made up the sample 
(Appendix A).  We should stress that this sample does not represent the whole Russia quite accurately 
because many territories of non-European part of the country were not included.   
Per capita healthcare expenses of consolidated regional budgets
5
 (EXP) and indexes of healthcare 
system provision (PROV) were taken for inputs.  Expenses had been corrected subject to inflation rates.  
We derived the following simple formula for the Index of healthcare system provision:    
PROV = C×D×N×O, 
where:  
C – provision with hospital beds;  
D - provision with doctors; 
N - provision with nurses;  
O – provision with out-patient hospitals.  
All the source figures are taken from Russian Federal Statistical Service (Rosstat) database
6
.  
                                                 
3
 Settlement dispersion is proportional to the percentage of people living in localities inhabited by 
500 men or less.  
4
 See Russian Federation Cabinet of Ministers Decree №670, 11.22.2004.  
5
 Russian Federal Statistical Service (Rosstat) data was used for the period 2003 – 2009, MRR 
data – for the period 2007-2009.  
6
 http://www.gks.ru/dbscripts/Cbsd/DBInet.cgi 
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For social outputs we took variables common for such studies (Afonso and Aubyn 2005, 2006; 
Giordano and Tommasino 2011): life expectancy (LE) and infant mortality rate (IMR).  The last indicator 
require transformation as mortality can not stand for a “result” of healthcare.  Following (Afonso and 
Aubyn 2005) we calculated Infant Survival Rate (ISR):  
IMR
IMR
ISR


1000
 
Index is of the same dimension as the source indicator, though it increases together with the effi-
ciency rate.  
Another index had to be computed to represent technical output – the Index of Medical Service 
Total
7
 Amount (MSTA).  It is the sum of three variables (MRR data
8
):   
 Amount of services provided by hospitals for inpatients, per capita; 
 Amount of services provided by out-patient hospitals, per capita; 
 Amount of services provided by ambulance.   
Healthcare institutional reform indicators are the percentage shares of public health enterprises 
(MRR data),    
 transferred to one-channel financing through the medical insurance system;  (ODN);  
 using uniform information technologies for registration of amounts and costs of medical 
services provided (INF);  
 transferred to the salary payment system oriented towards results (RES);  
 using standards of healthcare services (STAND).   
Poll data on satisfaction with public medical services (SATISF) was also taken from MRR data-
base.  
Periods available for the variables are in the Table 1.  
Table 1. 
Variable Notation In the model Period 
Per capita healthcare expenses of consolidated 
regional budgets  
EXP  
Inputs 
 
2003-2009 
Index of healthcare system provision PROV 2003-2009 
Life expectancy  LE Social 
outputs 
2003-2009 
Infant Survival Rate ISR 2003-2009 
Index of Medical Service Total Amount  MSTA Technical 
output 
2007-2009 
                                                 
7
 In the whole text we refer to the services provided in public sector only. 
8
 http://www.minregion.ru/upload/02_dtp/100830_t.xls  
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Percentage of healthcare enterprises, trans-
ferred to one-channel financing through the 
medical insurance system   
ODN  
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
reform indica-
tors (factor of 
effectiveness) 
2007-2009 
Percentage of healthcare enterprises, using 
uniform information technologies for registra-
tion of amounts and costs of medical services 
provided  
INF 2007-2009 
Percentage of healthcare enterprises, trans-
ferred to the salary payment system oriented 
towards results 
RES 2007-2009 
Percentage of healthcare enterprises, using 
standards of healthcare services 
STAND 2007-2009 
People’s satisfaction with public medical 
services 
SATISF Support 
indicator 
2007-2009 
 
Correspondingly, the study is temporally divided into two modules: I) 2003 – 2009, II) 2007 – 
2009.  For the first module only social efficiency estimation is available so it serves rather descriptive and 
subsidiary purposes.  For the second model both technical and social efficiency scores were computed as 
a basis for structural analysis.     
All the calculations of efficiency scores are made by Data Envelopment Analisys method.  In the 
view of the general social accent of this study we perform output-oriented DEA.  The results are given in 
Appendix B.  There are two inputs (EXP and PROV) in each model; two outputs (ISR and LE) are taken 
for the social efficiency and one output (MSTA) – for the technical efficiency.  
Analyzing social efficiency we focused on VRS scores primarily because of the nature of out-
puts in question.  Both infant survival rate and life expectancy can not grow infinitely, so the returns to 
scale will be diminishing in any case.  Meanwhile, for technical outputs the last is less obvious.  Anyway, 
we use CRS scores as secondary role values, mainly to check the robustness of our conclusions.   
First of all, it was worthwhile ensuring that computed efficiency scores possess sort of “temporal 
sustainability” – do not change dramatically each year.  Otherwise we should accept an unrealistic 
assumption that efficiency rate has no “inertia”, that it doesn’t depend on it’s previous values.  Subject to 
only a few levels in the time series we used correlation
9
 analysis instead of autoregression or autocorrela-
tion function.  Correlations between efficiency scores in the points of time t and t+1 are given in table 2 
(in boldface), model I data is used.  Note that in this case time series are stationary by construction, so 
correlations are not generated by trend. 
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 In the whole study correlation analysis is performed by Spearman’s technique (rank correlation), 
which is much more robust then traditional Pearson’s.   
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Table 2.  
 c
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crs2003 1,00 0,96 0,65 0,54 0,56 0,53 0,53 0,39 0,27 0,34 0,35 0,22 0,12 
crs2004 0,96 1,00 0,66 0,58 0,60 0,57 0,57 0,34 0,28 0,33 0,35 0,21 0,12 
crs2005 0,65 0,66 1,00 0,82 0,79 0,74 0,75 0,20 0,12 0,46 0,46 0,40 0,28 
crs2006 0,54 0,58 0,82 1,00 0,92 0,79 0,71 0,11 0,04 0,36 0,49 0,48 0,26 
crs2007 0,56 0,60 0,79 0,92 1,00 0,82 0,75 0,10 0,03 0,34 0,45 0,50 0,26 
crs2008 0,53 0,57 0,74 0,79 0,82 1,00 0,91 0,14 0,05 0,32 0,43 0,37 0,29 
crs2009 0,53 0,57 0,75 0,71 0,75 0,91 1,00 0,05 -0,01 0,22 0,32 0,28 0,19 
vrs2003 0,39 0,34 0,20 0,11 0,10 0,14 0,05 1,00 0,93 0,79 0,73 0,63 0,68 
vrs2004 0,27 0,28 0,12 0,04 0,03 0,05 -0,01 0,93 1,00 0,77 0,69 0,61 0,69 
vrs2005 0,34 0,33 0,46 0,36 0,34 0,32 0,22 0,79 0,77 1,00 0,89 0,81 0,88 
vrs2006 0,35 0,35 0,46 0,49 0,45 0,43 0,32 0,73 0,69 0,89 1,00 0,89 0,88 
vrs2007 0,22 0,21 0,40 0,48 0,50 0,37 0,28 0,63 0,61 0,81 0,89 1,00 0,84 
vrs2008 0,12 0,12 0,28 0,26 0,26 0,29 0,19 0,68 0,69 0,88 0,88 0,84 1,00 
vrs2009 0,27 0,28 0,33 0,33 0,34 0,44 0,42 0,67 0,64 0,77 0,81 0,76 0,86 
Note: all boldface coefficients are significant (p≤0,05) 
 
Both for CRS and VRS scores average correlation equals to 0,85.  It is one evidence for validity 
of the estimations, not sufficient but important.  
The correlations between VRS and CRS scores at the same time points (italics) are much less 
strong (0,41 on the average).  It is not a surprise: as we stated above, CRS and VRS are in fact two differ-
ent measures of efficiency.   
The second task was to study the implications of healthcare reforms on efficiency rates.  Again 
we have to mention that it should have been solved with autoregression ( tttt XYY    11 ) or dis-
tributed lag ( ttttt XXYY    1211 ) models if long time series were available.  We perform 
simple OLS regression.  Independent variables are reform performance indicators (ODN, INF, STAND, 
RES) and their first order differences (ΔODN, ΔINF, ΔSTAND, ΔRES).  It is remarkable, by the way, that 
these variables are not correlated, so separate healthcare reforms are being realized in different regions 
with different intensity.  There are no clear clusters of “leaders” or “outsiders”.  This fact of itself puts a 
question regarding systematic character of reforms carried out.  At the same time, in terms of multiple 
regression technique it is positive; no collinearity problems have to be solved.  
Dependent variables are social efficiency scores and Malmquist indexes (EFFCh and PECh for 
CRS and VRS scores respectively) showing efficiency changes.  Having no strong presuppositions about 
lag structure, we perform a wide range of models:  
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 iltii eXY  , , l=[0,1,2].  Efficiency in i-th region depends on achieved reform results (vector X) in 
the same (t) or in the previous (t-1) or in the preceding the previous (t-2) year.    
 iltii eXY  , , l=[0,1,2].  Changes in efficiency depend on achieved reform results in the same or 
in the previous or in the preceding the previous year.  
 iltii eXY  , , l=[0,1].  Efficiency depends on changes in reform performance in year t in compari-
son to tear t-1 or in year t-1 in comparison to year t-2.  
 iltii eXY  ,  l=[0,1].  Changes in efficiency depend on changes in reform performance.  
Main results of multiple regression are given in Table 3.  
Table 3.  
№ Independent variable Dependent 
variable 
Significant predictors and 
Beta-weights 
R-square 
1 Stand, Inf, Res (2007
10
) csr2008 Res (Beta*=0,3) 0,16 
2 Stand, Inf, Res (2007) vrs2008 Res (Beta=0,26*), Stand 
(Beta=0,31*) 
0,19 
3 Stand, Inf, Res (2007) vrs2009 Res (Beta=0,29*), Stand 
(Beta=0,29*) 
0,18 
4 Stand, Inf, Res (2007) effch2007-
2008 
Res (Beta=0,32*) 0,12 
5 Stand, Inf, Res, Odn 
(2008) 
csr2008 Odn (Beta=0,54**) 0,36 
6 Stand, Inf, Res, Odn 
(2008) 
csr2009 Odn (Beta=0,53**) 0,34 
7 Stand, Inf, Res, Odn 
(2008) 
vrs2008 Odn (Beta=0,33*) 0,17 
8 Stand, Inf, Res, Odn 
(2008) 
vrs2009 Odn (Beta=0,32*) 0,19 
9 Stand, Inf, Res, Odn 
(2008) 
effch2007-
2008 
Odn (Beta=0,46**) 0,23 
10 Stand, Inf, Res, Odn 
(2009) 
csr2009 Odn (Beta=0,51**) 0,27 
11 ΔStand, ΔInf, ΔRes, 
ΔOdn (2007-2008) 
csr2008 ΔInf (Beta=-0,27*) , ΔRes 
(Beta=0,27*), ΔOdn 
(Beta=0,45**) 
0,44 
12 ΔStand, ΔInf, ΔRes, 
ΔOdn (2007-2008) 
csr2009 ΔInf (Beta=-0,29*) , ΔRes 
(Beta=0,37**), ΔOdn 
(Beta=0,38**), ΔStand (Beta=-
0,25*) 
0,49 
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 In 2007 one-channel financing reform didn’t get started, all ODN values are equal to zero, thus 
for this year the variable is not included in the model.  
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13 ΔStand, ΔInf, ΔRes, 
ΔOdn (2007-2008) 
vrs2008 ΔOdn (Beta=0,33*) 0,21 
14 ΔStand, ΔInf, ΔRes, 
ΔOdn (2007-2008) 
vrs2009 ΔOdn (Beta=0,32*) 0,21 
15 ΔStand, ΔInf, ΔRes, 
ΔOdn (2007-2008) 
effch2007-
2008 
ΔOdn (Beta=0,41**) 0,22 
16 ΔStand, ΔInf, ΔRes, 
ΔOdn (2008-2009) 
effch2008-
2009 
ΔOdn (Beta=0,24*), ΔStand 
(Beta=-0,36**) 
0,23 
17 ΔStand, ΔInf, ΔRes, 
ΔOdn (2008-2009) 
pech2008-
2009 
ΔOdn (Beta=0,42**) 0,2 
* Beta-coefficients are significant at ≤0,05  
**Beta-coefficients are significant at ≤0,01 
 
Regression results above allow us to make the following conclusions.  Substantial (but not 
strong at all) influence over the social efficiency is exercised by transferring to one-channel financing 
(ODN).  In 13 models beta-coefficient with this variable is positive and significant, furthermore in 10 
cases it is the single significant predictor.  Implementation of the new salary payment system (RES) also 
shows some degree of influence, but it is very weak.  And we have no evidence for any positive effect of 
uniform information technologies and standards of healthcare services.  In models 11, 12 and 16 we even 
observe negative Betas.  Of course, one can not reject the opportunity that the real lag here is more than 
two or three years and we’ll be witnessing the triumph of healthcare reforms in close future.  But for 
today the results are not very inspiriting.  
The next stage is the analysis of correlations between technical (resources → amount of medical 
services) and social (resources → infant survival rate and life expectancy) efficiency rates.  Coefficients 
are in Table 4.  
Table 4.  
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Technical VRS 
2007 0,54** 0,33* 0,32* -0,31* 0 
Technical VRS 
2008  0,27 0,28  -0,04 
Technical VRS 
2009   0,28  0,03 
Technical 
(PECh) 07-08  -0,368 -0,318 0,36* 0,1 
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Technical 
(PECh) 08-09   0,16  -0,05 
 * Coefficients are significant at ≤0,05  
**Coefficients are significant at ≤0,01 
 
As in the previous case, the structure is not articulated.  We observe rather weak positive 
correlations only for year 2007 when reforms got started.  One possible explanation for those results is 
high variance of an unobserved parameter mediating the link between social and technical efficiency – 
quality of medical services provided.    
Finally, there is not a trace of a correlation between efficiency (both technical and social) and 
customer’s satisfaction rates (Table 5).  We presume that another unobserved factor – high (or widely 
variable over regions) costs of obtaining services may play a critical role here. 
Table 5. 
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Satisfaction 2007 -0,07 -0,01 0,08 0,12 0,14 0,00 0,18 0,17 0,34* -0,13 
Satisfaction 2008 0,11 0,12 0,08 -0,03 -0,06 0,08 0,22 0,19 0,18 -0,24 
Satisfaction 2009 0,01 0,10 0,04 0,12 -0,08 0,03 0,11 0,07 0,12 -0,05 
Δsatisfaction 07-08 0,21 0,17 0,04 -0,18 -0,18 0,12 0,08 0,04 -0,15 -0,15 
Δsatisfaction 08-09 -0,13 0,01 0,00 0,22 -0,01 -0,04 -0,15 -0,14 -0,12 0,29 
* Coefficients are significant at ≤0,05 
 
In summary, we have to state that the overall effectiveness of the Russian healthcare system, 
inscribed in the social and governmental environment, is far from perfect.  The structures we observed are 
not arranged properly.  First, institutional reforms do not have a serious impact on the region’s efficiency 
rates.  Second, correlations between technical and social efficiency is fading.  Third, there is absolutely no 
links between people’s satisfaction and efficiency of both sorts.  
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Appendix A.  Network norm coefficients for the subjects of Russian Federation.  Sampled 
regions are boldfaced.  Source:  Ministry of Regional Development, 
http://www.minregion.ru/upload/13_dmio/exec_evaluation/100512-raschet-neef-rash.xls 
 
Federation subject 2007 2008 2009 Federation subject 2007 2008 2009 
Altai territory 1,08 1,08 1,08 Primorie territory 1,05 1,05 1,05 
Amur region 1,15 1,15 1,14 Pskov region 1 1 1 
Arkhangelsk region 1,2 1,2 1,2 Republic of Adygeya 1,06 1,06 1,06 
Astrakhan region 1 1 1 Republic of Altai 1,38 1,38 1,38 
Belgorod region 1 1 1 Republic of Bashkortostan 1 1 1 
Bryansk region 1 1 1 Republic of Buryatia 1,15 1,16 1,15 
Vladimir region 1 1 1 Republic of Dagestan 1,1 1,1 1,09 
Volgograd region 1 1 1 Republic of Ingoushetia 1,03 1,03 1,03 
Vologda region 1 1 1 Republic of Kalmykia 1 1 1 
Voronezh region 1 1 1 Republic of Karelia 1,09 1,09 1,09 
the City of Moscow 1 1 1 Republic of Komi 1,14 1,14 1,14 
thr City of Saint-
Petersburg 1 1 1 
Republic of Marij El 
1 1 1 
Jewish autonomous region 1,11 1,11 1,11 Republic of Mordovia 1 1 1 
Zabaykalye territory 1,14 1,14 1,13 Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 1,52 1,52 1,51 
Ivanovo region 
1 1 1 
Republic of North Ossetia – 
Alania 1,04 1,04 1,04 
Irkutsk region 1,09 1,09 1,09 Republic of Tatarstan 1 1 1 
Kabardino-Balkarian 
Republic  1,03 1,03 1,03 
Republic of Tuva 
1,18 1,19 1,18 
Kaliningrad region 1 1 1 Republic of Khakassia 1,06 1,06 1,06 
Kaluga region 1 1 1 Rostov region 1 1 1 
Kamchatka territoty 1,1 1,1 1,14 Ryazan region 1 1 1 
Karachaevo-Chercessian 
Republic 1,07 1,07 1,07 
Samara region 
1 1 1 
Kemerovo region 1,05 1,05 1,05 Saratov region 1 1 1 
Kirov region 1 1 1 Sakhalin region 1,1 1,1 1,1 
Kostroma region 1 1 1 Sverdlovsk region 1 1 1 
Krasnodar territory 1,04 1,04 1,04 Smolensk region 1 1 1 
Krasnoyarsk territory 1,13 1,13 1,15 Stavropol territory 1,04 1,04 1,04 
Kurgan region 1 1 1 Tambov region 1 1 1 
Kursk region 1 1 1 Tver region 1 1 1 
Leningrad region 1 1 1 Tomsk region 1,16 1,16 1,15 
Lipetsk region 1 1 1 Tula region 1 1 1 
Magadan region 1,54 1,54 1,55 Tyumen region 1,14 1,14 1,14 
Moscow region 1 1 1 Udmurtian Republic 1 1 1 
Murmansk region 1,02 1,02 1,02 Ulyanovsk region 1 1 1 
Nenets autonomous district 1,2 1,2 1,2 Khabarovsk territory 1,1 1,1 1,11 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 
1 1 1 
Khanty-Mansijsk autonomous 
district - Yugra 1,14 1,14 1,14 
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Novrorod region 1 1 1 Chelyabinsk region 1,06 1,06 1,06 
Novosibirsk region 1 1 1 Chechen Republic 1,03 1,03 1,03 
Omsk region 1 1 1 Chuvashi  Republic 1 1 1 
Orenburg region 1 1 1 Chukotka autonomous district 1,75 1,75 1,75 
Oryol region 
1 1 1 
Yamalo-Nenets autonomous 
district 1,14 1,14 1,14 
Penza region 1 1 1 Yaroslavl region 1 1 1 
Perm territory 1,1 1,1 1,12         
 
 
 
 
Appendix B.  Efficiency scores 
 
Table B1.  Social efficiency scores (CRS), 2003 – 2009   
Federation subject crs2003 crs2004 crs2005 Crs2006 crs2007 crs2008 crs2009 
Astrakhan region 0,62 0,63 0,72 0,59 0,55 0,42 0,48 
Belgorod region 0,89 0,91 0,82 0,77 1 0,76 0,81 
Bryansk region 0,82 0,86 0,84 0,89 0,83 0,82 0,94 
Vladimir region 0,86 0,85 1 1 0,92 1 1 
Volgograd region 0,87 0,86 0,85 0,84 0,8 0,64 0,63 
Vologda region 0,58 0,57 0,51 0,58 0,58 0,56 0,66 
Voronezh region 0,74 0,71 0,73 0,8 0,73 0,64 0,65 
the City of Moscow 0,44 0,44 0,39 0,34 0,33 0,27 0,28 
thr City of Saint-
Petersburg 0,71 0,68 0,52 0,54 0,45 0,31 0,31 
Ivanovo region 0,71 0,71 0,8 0,64 0,63 0,69 0,73 
Kaliningrad region 
0,9 0,9 0,97 1 1 1 1 
Kaluga region 0,77 0,76 0,8 0,78 0,75 0,73 0,69 
Kirov region 0,37 0,35 0,68 0,73 0,75 0,58 0,52 
Kostroma region 0,79 0,83 0,87 0,88 0,89 0,78 0,82 
Kurgan region 0,85 0,85 1 1 1 0,96 0,96 
Kursk region 1 0,82 0,89 1 1 0,78 0,77 
Leningrad region 1 1 1 1 0,91 0,96 1 
Lipetsk region 0,54 0,57 0,46 0,49 0,5 0,48 0,58 
Moscow region 0,74 0,71 0,7 0,59 0,71 0,75 0,7 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 
0,86 0,9 0,78 0,81 0,71 0,62 0,69 
Novrorod region 0,76 0,8 0,67 0,69 0,76 0,49 0,53 
Novosibirsk region 
0,58 0,61 0,67 0,66 0,66 0,53 0,58 
Omsk region 0,6 0,49 0,48 0,48 0,43 0,42 0,46 
Orenburg region 1 1 0,61 0,59 0,54 0,48 0,51 
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Oryol region 0,81 0,81 0,88 0,96 0,89 0,73 0,83 
Penza region 0,57 0,58 0,91 0,87 0,76 0,8 0,87 
Pskov region 0,71 0,72 0,78 0,84 0,76 0,82 0,79 
Republic of 
Bashkortostan 0,72 0,79 0,74 0,71 0,72 0,79 0,79 
Republic of Kalmykia 0,52 0,56 0,9 0,83 0,75 0,52 0,53 
Republic of Marij El 0,79 0,72 0,76 0,7 0,72 0,64 0,83 
Republic of Mordovia 0,66 0,67 0,61 0,82 0,64 0,55 0,51 
Republic of Tatarstan 0,59 0,62 0,66 0,9 0,9 1 0,71 
Rostov region 1 1 1 0,98 0,99 1 0,99 
Ryazan region 0,73 0,76 0,67 0,74 0,71 0,48 0,51 
Samara region 1 1 0,95 0,7 0,7 0,71 0,77 
Saratov region 0,83 0,89 0,9 0,89 0,87 0,64 0,67 
Sverdlovsk region 0,67 0,66 0,65 0,61 0,53 0,52 0,62 
Smolensk region 0,7 0,68 0,88 0,91 0,94 0,63 0,76 
Tambov region 0,92 0,96 1 1 1 1 1 
Tver region 0,74 0,71 0,7 0,7 0,65 0,62 0,57 
Tula region 0,69 0,7 0,71 0,73 0,72 0,65 0,74 
Udmurtian Republic 0,52 0,56 0,6 0,55 0,54 0,61 0,72 
Ulyanovsk region 0,7 0,74 0,78 0,81 0,77 0,66 0,71 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,86 0,77 0,88 0,69 0,61 0,57 0,58 
Yaroslavl region 0,54 0,58 0,67 0,59 0,53 0,48 0,57 
 
Table B2.  Social efficiency scores (VRS), 2003 – 2009   
Federation subject vrs2003 vrs2004 vrs2005 vrs2006 vrs2007 vrs2008 vrs2009 
Astrakhan region 0,956 0,957 0,959 0,954 0,952 0,959 0,96 
Belgorod region 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bryansk region 0,949 0,949 0,948 0,982 0,952 0,948 0,984 
Vladimir region 0,95 0,927 1 1 0,955 1 1 
Volgograd region 0,983 0,988 1 0,991 0,99 0,981 0,989 
Vologda region 0,914 0,918 0,917 0,943 0,947 0,946 0,948 
Voronezh region 0,968 0,963 0,98 0,974 0,968 0,963 0,982 
the City of Moscow 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
thr City of Saint-
Petersburg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ivanovo region 0,918 0,916 0,931 0,93 0,935 0,939 0,958 
Kaliningrad region 
0,936 0,929 0,971 1 1 1 1 
Kaluga region 0,946 0,944 0,956 0,955 0,952 0,95 0,956 
Kirov region 0,908 0,904 0,95 0,959 0,964 0,952 0,957 
Kostroma region 0,918 0,926 0,944 0,962 0,971 0,949 0,967 
Kurgan region 0,955 0,953 1 1 1 0,969 0,969 
Kursk region 1 0,956 0,977 1 1 0,956 0,98 
Akhremenko - 24 
Leningrad region 1 1 1 1 0,971 0,969 1 
Lipetsk region 0,953 0,991 0,944 0,954 0,952 0,957 0,972 
Moscow region 0,997 0,984 0,991 0,983 0,969 0,986 0,982 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 
0,95 0,951 0,944 0,951 0,94 0,939 0,961 
Novrorod region 0,897 0,906 0,914 0,908 0,922 0,9 0,905 
Novosibirsk region 
0,952 0,951 0,959 0,96 0,964 0,963 0,978 
Omsk region 0,957 0,946 0,936 0,944 0,935 0,95 0,962 
Orenburg region 1 1 0,952 0,952 0,944 0,942 0,952 
Oryol region 0,964 0,957 0,978 0,991 0,98 0,964 0,989 
Penza region 0,975 0,973 0,98 0,987 0,973 0,977 0,995 
Pskov region 0,893 0,891 0,898 0,905 0,919 0,913 0,919 
Republic of 
Bashkortostan 0,977 0,973 0,978 0,98 0,966 0,968 0,987 
Republic of Kalmykia 0,955 0,98 1 0,998 0,982 0,975 0,962 
Republic of Marij El 0,942 0,928 0,948 0,937 0,948 0,945 0,97 
Republic of Mordovia 0,965 0,969 0,971 1 0,971 0,977 0,964 
Republic of Tatarstan 0,992 0,99 1 1 1 1 1 
Rostov region 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ryazan region 0,937 0,947 0,945 0,947 0,941 0,941 0,952 
Samara region 1 1 1 1 0,954 0,958 0,972 
Saratov region 0,965 0,973 0,998 0,994 0,988 0,971 0,986 
Sverdlovsk region 0,935 0,942 0,94 0,957 0,953 0,955 0,963 
Smolensk region 0,917 0,92 0,94 0,948 0,96 0,919 0,945 
Tambov region 0,974 0,985 1 1 1 1 1 
Tver region 0,898 0,901 0,909 0,91 0,914 0,918 0,916 
Tula region 0,921 0,922 0,928 0,929 0,929 0,928 0,947 
Udmurtian Republic 0,932 0,931 0,942 0,95 0,945 0,956 0,98 
Ulyanovsk region 0,96 0,963 0,966 0,963 0,96 0,963 0,978 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,994 0,971 1 0,968 0,958 0,966 0,97 
Yaroslavl region 0,917 0,923 0,97 0,953 0,95 0,958 0,972 
 
Table  B3.  Malmquist indexes: social efficiency change (CRS), 2004-2009   
 effch2004 effch2005 effch2006 effch2007 effch2008 effch2009 
Astrakhan region 1,014 1,135 0,821 0,93 0,767 0,927 
Belgorod region 1,024 0,899 0,936 1,307 0,764 0,936 
Bryansk region 1,046 0,976 1,058 0,931 0,998 1,045 
Vladimir region 0,994 1,174 1 0,922 1,085 1,013 
Volgograd region 0,99 0,989 0,988 0,953 0,803 0,892 
Vologda region 0,986 0,888 1,142 1,003 0,971 1,122 
Voronezh region 0,956 1,036 1,093 0,907 0,882 0,934 
the City of Moscow 1,02 0,873 0,876 0,972 0,817 0,959 
Akhremenko - 25 
thr City of Saint-
Petersburg 0,96 0,771 1,04 0,836 0,679 0,908 
Ivanovo region 1,011 1,118 0,803 0,982 1,102 0,985 
Kaliningrad region 
0,998 1,077 1,032 1 1 1 
Kaluga region 0,979 1,059 0,972 0,964 0,981 0,914 
Kirov region 0,949 1,944 1,066 1,027 0,779 1,056 
Kostroma region 1,045 1,043 1,022 1,005 0,878 1,24 
Kurgan region 1,001 1,179 1 1 0,962 0,943 
Kursk region 0,819 1,084 1,126 1 0,783 1,028 
Leningrad region 1 1 1 0,914 1,052 0,942 
Lipetsk region 1,052 0,821 1,064 1,003 0,975 1,102 
Moscow region 0,962 0,983 0,849 1,203 1,055 0,943 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 
1,044 0,867 1,043 0,879 0,865 0,957 
Novrorod region 1,054 0,844 1,029 1,094 0,651 1,073 
Novosibirsk region 
1,052 1,098 0,995 0,998 0,797 0,968 
Omsk region 0,824 0,964 1,013 0,9 0,964 1,04 
Orenburg region 1 0,605 0,978 0,908 0,89 1,008 
Oryol region 0,992 1,087 1,096 0,929 0,818 1,085 
Penza region 1,005 1,575 0,957 0,878 1,047 0,946 
Pskov region 1,003 1,088 1,086 0,9 1,08 0,921 
Republic of 
Bashkortostan 1,099 0,938 0,957 1,017 1,095 0,929 
Republic of Kalmykia 1,068 1,614 0,926 0,904 0,693 0,975 
Republic of Marij El 0,912 1,048 0,924 1,026 0,899 1,045 
Republic of Mordovia 1,016 0,907 1,336 0,782 0,865 0,989 
Republic of Tatarstan 1,049 1,071 1,355 0,998 1,114 0,981 
Rostov region 1 1 0,976 1,011 1,013 0,949 
Ryazan region 1,033 0,883 1,11 0,952 0,673 1,171 
Samara region 1 0,951 0,738 1,001 1,009 0,943 
Saratov region 1,066 1,021 0,986 0,981 0,729 0,974 
Sverdlovsk region 0,981 0,98 0,938 0,866 0,98 1,048 
Smolensk region 0,961 1,31 1,028 1,03 0,67 0,918 
Tambov region 1,042 1,04 1 1 1 0,943 
Tver region 0,953 0,997 0,988 0,93 0,951 0,992 
Tula region 1,017 1,015 1,024 0,981 0,908 1,093 
Udmurtian Republic 1,064 1,078 0,923 0,973 1,139 1 
Ulyanovsk region 1,062 1,053 1,038 0,955 0,847 0,983 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,904 1,143 0,783 0,875 0,937 1,032 
Yaroslavl region 1,068 1,164 0,869 0,902 0,907 0,997 
 
Table B4.  Malmquist indexes: social pure efficiency change (VRS), 2004-2009 
Akhremenko - 26 
Federation subject pech2004 pech2005 pech2006 pech2007 pech2008 pech2009 
Astrakhan region 1,001 1,003 0,994 0,998 1,008 1,001 
Belgorod region 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bryansk region 1 0,999 1,036 0,97 0,996 1,038 
Vladimir region 0,975 1,079 1 0,955 1,047 1 
Volgograd region 1,005 1,012 0,991 0,999 0,991 1,009 
Vologda region 1,004 0,998 1,029 1,004 0,999 1,002 
Voronezh region 0,995 1,018 0,994 0,993 0,994 1,02 
the City of Moscow 1 1 1 1 1 1 
thr City of Saint-
Petersburg 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ivanovo region 0,998 1,017 0,999 1,005 1,004 1,02 
Kaliningrad region 
0,993 1,045 1,03 1 1 1 
Kaluga region 0,998 1,013 0,999 0,997 0,997 1,006 
Kirov region 0,996 1,05 1,01 1,005 0,988 1,006 
Kostroma region 1,009 1,019 1,02 1,009 0,977 1,019 
Kurgan region 0,998 1,049 1 1 0,969 1 
Kursk region 0,956 1,023 1,023 1 0,956 1,025 
Leningrad region 1 1 1 0,971 0,999 1,032 
Lipetsk region 1,039 0,953 1,011 0,997 1,005 1,015 
Moscow region 0,987 1,007 0,992 0,986 1,018 0,996 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 
1,001 0,993 1,007 0,989 0,998 1,024 
Novrorod region 1,01 1,01 0,993 1,015 0,976 1,006 
Novosibirsk region 
0,999 1,008 1,002 1,004 1 1,015 
Omsk region 0,989 0,989 1,009 0,99 1,017 1,012 
Orenburg region 1 0,952 1 0,991 0,998 1,01 
Oryol region 0,993 1,022 1,013 0,989 0,984 1,025 
Penza region 0,998 1,008 1,007 0,986 1,004 1,019 
Pskov region 0,998 1,008 1,007 1,016 0,994 1,007 
Republic of 
Bashkortostan 0,996 1,005 1,002 0,986 1,002 1,02 
Republic of Kalmykia 1,026 1,02 0,998 0,983 0,993 0,987 
Republic of Marij El 0,986 1,021 0,988 1,012 0,997 1,026 
Republic of Mordovia 1,004 1,002 1,03 0,971 1,005 0,987 
Republic of Tatarstan 0,998 1,01 1 1 1 1 
Rostov region 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ryazan region 1,011 0,997 1,003 0,994 1 1,011 
Samara region 1 1 1 0,954 1,004 1,015 
Saratov region 1,008 1,026 0,996 0,994 0,983 1,015 
Sverdlovsk region 1,008 0,998 1,018 0,995 1,003 1,009 
Akhremenko - 27 
Smolensk region 1,003 1,022 1,008 1,012 0,958 1,028 
Tambov region 1,011 1,016 1 1 1 1 
Tver region 1,003 1,009 1,001 1,004 1,004 0,998 
Tula region 1,002 1,006 1,001 1 0,999 1,021 
Udmurtian Republic 0,999 1,013 1,008 0,995 1,011 1,025 
Ulyanovsk region 1,003 1,002 0,997 0,997 1,003 1,015 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,977 1,03 0,968 0,99 1,008 1,003 
Yaroslavl region 1,006 1,051 0,983 0,997 1,008 1,015 
 
Table B5.  Malmquist indexes: social total factor productivity change (CRS), 2004-2009  
Federation subject tfpch2004 tfpch2005 tfpch2006 tfpch2007 tfpch2008 tfpch2009 
Astrakhan region 0,92 0,822 0,75 0,864 1,084 1,143 
Belgorod region 0,935 0,8 0,917 1,375 0,919 1,157 
Bryansk region 0,963 0,85 1,006 0,95 1,291 1,17 
Vladimir region 0,924 1,063 0,937 0,985 1,431 1,027 
Volgograd region 0,906 0,844 0,859 0,902 1,107 0,999 
Vologda region 0,922 0,793 1,145 0,999 1,145 1,195 
Voronezh region 0,876 0,926 0,983 0,9 1,157 1,045 
the City of Moscow 0,936 0,77 0,854 1,011 0,993 1,063 
thr City of Saint-
Petersburg 0,937 0,64 1,085 1,039 0,909 0,995 
Ivanovo region 0,927 0,907 0,738 0,994 1,45 1,061 
Kaliningrad region 
0,943 0,97 1,143 1,009 1,327 1,008 
Kaluga region 0,899 0,937 0,876 0,949 1,187 0,952 
Kirov region 0,874 1,682 0,951 0,926 1,133 0,903 
Kostroma region 0,958 0,885 0,909 0,956 1,267 1,066 
Kurgan region 0,958 1,035 0,929 0,921 1,123 1 
Kursk region 0,75 0,918 1,023 0,916 1,118 0,974 
Leningrad region 0,92 0,909 1,19 0,803 1,174 1,217 
Lipetsk region 0,995 0,709 1,026 1,02 1,36 1,194 
Moscow region 0,876 0,883 0,886 1,074 1,31 1,004 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 
0,957 0,743 0,907 0,838 1,148 1,131 
Novrorod region 0,964 0,747 0,883 1,076 0,895 1,088 
Novosibirsk region 
0,966 0,846 0,893 0,954 1,09 1,117 
Omsk region 0,757 0,846 0,951 0,904 1,214 1,128 
Orenburg region 0,914 0,449 0,866 0,893 1,124 1,084 
Oryol region 0,911 0,959 0,95 0,911 1,111 1,139 
Penza region 0,965 1,432 0,867 0,838 1,183 1,141 
Pskov region 0,923 0,946 0,945 0,891 1,281 1 
Akhremenko - 28 
Republic of 
Bashkortostan 1,016 0,836 0,89 0,981 1,33 1,012 
Republic of Kalmykia 1,009 1,363 0,839 0,833 0,939 1,025 
Republic of Marij El 0,836 0,9 0,801 1,014 1,209 1,307 
Republic of Mordovia 0,929 0,785 1,232 0,918 1,087 0,95 
Republic of Tatarstan 0,995 0,914 1,41 1,021 1,401 0,757 
Rostov region 0,941 0,885 0,885 0,926 1,213 0,991 
Ryazan region 0,944 0,726 0,968 0,898 0,965 1,092 
Samara region 0,97 0,781 0,834 1,023 1,145 1,135 
Saratov region 0,975 0,881 0,849 0,95 0,979 1,08 
Sverdlovsk region 0,916 0,866 0,919 0,873 1,136 1,232 
Smolensk region 0,907 0,943 0,941 0,933 0,974 1,202 
Tambov region 0,955 0,915 0,868 1,113 1,544 0,877 
Tver region 0,875 0,866 0,861 0,905 1,158 0,971 
Tula region 0,935 0,893 0,96 0,992 1,101 1,172 
Udmurtian Republic 0,974 0,881 0,827 0,942 1,632 1,166 
Ulyanovsk region 1 0,92 0,94 0,938 1,052 1,101 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,865 0,968 0,687 0,939 1,189 1,036 
Yaroslavl region 0,976 1,004 0,794 0,953 1,284 1,177 
 
 
Table  B6.  Social efficiency scores, (CRS and VRS), 2007 – 2009   
Federation subject crs2007 crs2008 crs2009 vrs2007 vrs2008 vrs2009 
Astrakhan region 0,562 0,366 0,393 0,948 0,956 0,951 
Belgorod region 1 0,712 0,786 1 1 1 
Bryansk region 0,846 0,735 0,811 0,948 0,945 0,956 
Vladimir region 0,967 0,869 0,9 1 0,933 0,935 
Volgograd region 0,78 0,561 0,526 0,983 0,976 0,973 
Vologda region 0,664 0,543 0,586 0,948 0,946 0,944 
Voronezh region 0,727 0,577 0,563 0,962 0,96 0,965 
the City of Moscow 0,355 0,256 0,246 1 1 1 
thr City of Saint-Petersburg 0,439 0,297 0,286 1 1 1 
Ivanovo region 0,611 0,605 0,614 0,928 0,935 0,936 
Kaliningrad region 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kaluga region 0,738 0,68 0,601 0,945 0,948 0,949 
Kirov region 0,739 0,442 0,445 0,956 0,947 0,948 
Kostroma region 0,899 0,618 0,725 0,952 0,943 0,945 
Kurgan region 1 0,925 0,824 1 0,968 0,962 
Kursk region 0,965 0,598 0,621 0,968 0,95 0,956 
Leningrad region 0,914 0,907 1 0,971 0,969 1 
Lipetsk region 0,491 0,403 0,484 0,947 0,953 0,957 
Moscow region 0,714 0,742 0,7 0,969 0,986 0,982 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 0,744 0,569 0,672 0,936 0,937 0,943 
Novrorod region 0,732 0,446 0,468 0,913 0,896 0,901 
Novosibirsk region 0,697 0,468 0,507 0,959 0,96 0,965 
Omsk region 0,465 0,388 0,419 0,934 0,948 0,957 
Orenburg region 0,599 0,447 0,448 0,945 0,94 0,945 
Akhremenko - 29 
Oryol region 0,881 0,644 0,703 0,965 0,961 0,965 
Penza region 0,847 0,789 0,792 0,974 0,977 0,978 
Pskov region 0,763 0,764 0,664 0,912 0,913 0,91 
Republic of Bashkortostan 0,757 0,733 0,674 0,963 0,966 0,97 
Republic of Kalmykia 0,782 0,487 0,465 0,976 0,972 0,956 
Republic of Marij El 0,906 0,723 0,843 0,951 0,946 0,946 
Republic of Mordovia 0,836 0,53 0,471 0,976 0,977 0,964 
Republic of Tatarstan 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Rostov region 0,965 0,957 0,822 1 0,999 0,992 
Ryazan region 0,817 0,394 0,439 0,94 0,937 0,942 
Samara region 0,731 0,679 0,666 0,954 0,958 0,959 
Saratov region 0,94 0,582 0,603 0,978 0,968 0,97 
Sverdlovsk region 0,512 0,479 0,536 0,953 0,954 0,957 
Smolensk region 0,972 0,459 0,649 1 0,914 0,922 
Tambov region 1 1 0,817 1 1 0,97 
Tver region 0,699 0,605 0,498 0,912 0,919 0,916 
Tula region 0,675 0,587 0,606 0,921 0,926 0,937 
Udmurtian Republic 0,599 0,472 0,592 0,943 0,952 0,958 
Ulyanovsk region 0,756 0,616 0,609 0,952 0,962 0,965 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,704 0,537 0,522 0,957 0,966 0,964 
Yaroslavl region 0,578 0,434 0,511 0,947 0,956 0,962 
 
Table  B7 Malmquist indexes: social efficiency, pure efficiency and total factor productivity change, 2007-2009 
 
Federation subject effch2008 effch2009 pech2008 pech2009 tfpch2008 tfpch2009 
Astrakhan region 0,652 1,073 1,009 0,995 1,103 1,038 
Belgorod region 0,712 1,104 1 1 0,857 1,231 
Bryansk region 0,869 1,102 0,998 1,011 1,251 1,139 
Vladimir region 0,899 1,036 0,933 1,002 1,353 1,052 
Volgograd region 0,72 0,937 0,994 0,996 1,116 0,957 
Vologda region 0,819 1,078 0,997 0,998 1,067 1,181 
Voronezh region 0,794 0,977 0,998 1,006 1,15 1,032 
the City of Moscow 0,722 0,959 1 1 0,98 1,039 
thr City of Saint-Petersburg 0,676 0,962 1 1 0,879 0,996 
Ivanovo region 0,99 1,015 1,007 1,001 1,442 1,052 
Kaliningrad region 1 1 1 1 1,347 1,038 
Kaluga region 0,922 0,883 1,003 1 1,178 0,972 
Kirov region 0,598 1,006 0,991 1,001 1,116 0,977 
Kostroma region 0,688 1,172 0,99 1,002 1,234 1,161 
Kurgan region 0,925 0,891 0,968 0,994 1,112 1,013 
Kursk region 0,619 1,039 0,981 1,006 1,134 0,962 
Leningrad region 0,992 1,102 0,998 1,032 1,175 1,22 
Lipetsk region 0,821 1,201 1,006 1,005 1,318 1,173 
Moscow region 1,04 0,943 1,018 0,996 1,301 1,01 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 0,764 1,181 1,001 1,007 1,21 1,147 
Novrorod region 0,61 1,049 0,982 1,005 0,955 1,119 
Novosibirsk region 0,672 1,082 1,002 1,005 1,094 1,069 
Omsk region 0,835 1,079 1,015 1,009 1,177 1,119 
Orenburg region 0,747 1,002 0,995 1,006 1,065 1,054 
Oryol region 0,731 1,091 0,996 1,005 1,154 1,123 
Akhremenko - 30 
Penza region 0,931 1,004 1,003 1,001 1,145 1,098 
Pskov region 1 0,87 1,001 0,997 1,239 1,011 
Republic of Bashkortostan 0,969 0,92 1,004 1,004 1,253 0,99 
Republic of Kalmykia 0,623 0,954 0,996 0,984 0,987 1,009 
Republic of Marij El 0,797 1,166 0,995 1 1,45 1,08 
Republic of Mordovia 0,634 0,888 1,001 0,986 1,016 0,932 
Republic of Tatarstan 1 1 1 1 1,68 0,964 
Rostov region 0,992 0,859 0,999 0,994 1,204 0,979 
Ryazan region 0,482 1,113 0,996 1,006 0,854 1,142 
Samara region 0,929 0,98 1,004 1,001 1,137 1,093 
Saratov region 0,619 1,037 0,99 1,002 1,002 1,058 
Sverdlovsk region 0,935 1,119 1,001 1,003 1,124 1,242 
Smolensk region 0,472 1,416 0,914 1,009 0,877 1,311 
Tambov region 1 0,817 1 0,97 1,593 0,8 
Tver region 0,865 0,824 1,007 0,997 1,189 0,944 
Tula region 0,87 1,033 1,006 1,012 1,081 1,176 
Udmurtian Republic 0,788 1,252 1,009 1,007 1,444 1,16 
Ulyanovsk region 0,815 0,988 1,01 1,003 1,049 1,086 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,762 0,973 1,009 0,999 1,178 1,009 
Yaroslavl region 0,75 1,177 1,01 1,006 1,339 1,092 
 
Table  B8.  Technical efficiency scores, (CRS and VRS), 2007 – 2009   
 Federation subject crs2007 crs2008 crs2009 vrs2007 vrs2008 vrs2009 
Astrakhan region 0,542 0,385 0,439 0,813 0,8 0,826 
Belgorod region 0,938 0,798 0,736 0,981 0,972 0,846 
Bryansk region 0,976 0,824 0,862 1 0,973 0,928 
Vladimir region 0,99 0,958 1 0,998 1 1 
Volgograd region 0,772 0,607 0,554 0,85 0,885 0,83 
Vologda region 0,709 0,585 0,626 0,874 0,848 0,789 
Voronezh region 0,754 0,641 0,637 0,859 0,897 0,885 
the City of Moscow 0,449 0,345 0,336 1 1 1 
thr City of Saint-Petersburg 0,306 0,239 0,226 0,72 0,72 0,703 
Ivanovo region 0,643 0,653 0,659 0,823 0,874 0,826 
Kaliningrad region 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kaluga region 0,698 0,731 0,65 0,797 0,903 0,802 
Kirov region 0,732 0,478 0,445 0,852 0,855 0,771 
Kostroma region 0,948 0,699 0,826 0,96 0,973 0,901 
Kurgan region 0,984 0,897 0,828 1 0,898 0,834 
Kursk region 0,947 0,663 0,658 1 0,956 0,808 
Leningrad region 0,927 0,859 0,832 0,946 0,879 0,89 
Lipetsk region 0,595 0,51 0,626 0,948 0,971 0,974 
Moscow region 0,906 0,909 0,863 0,974 1 1 
Akhremenko - 31 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 
0,659 0,557 0,783 0,724 0,791 0,914 
Novrorod region 0,784 0,592 0,584 0,894 0,957 0,883 
Novosibirsk region 
0,611 0,48 0,53 0,746 0,798 0,797 
Omsk region 0,527 0,505 0,523 0,862 0,973 0,96 
Orenburg region 0,695 0,598 0,56 0,914 1 0,936 
Oryol region 0,781 0,59 0,63 0,798 0,774 0,721 
Penza region 0,969 0,884 0,994 1 1 1 
Pskov region 0,672 0,733 0,663 0,718 0,801 0,72 
Republic of Bashkortostan 
0,796 0,815 0,762 0,894 0,972 0,873 
Republic of Kalmykia 0,821 0,56 0,539 0,927 0,899 0,874 
Republic of Marij El 0,891 0,803 0,957 0,903 0,998 0,979 
Republic of Mordovia 0,908 0,662 0,605 1 1 0,96 
Republic of Tatarstan 1 1 0,963 1 1 1 
Rostov region 1 1 0,882 1 1 0,908 
Ryazan region 0,833 0,502 0,482 0,891 0,959 0,824 
Samara region 0,733 0,699 0,691 0,838 0,869 0,786 
Saratov region 1 0,683 0,668 1 0,963 0,866 
Sverdlovsk region 0,604 0,513 0,57 0,898 0,836 0,803 
Smolensk region 0,932 0,492 0,681 1 0,836 0,8 
Tambov region 0,897 0,837 0,842 0,897 0,938 0,89 
Tver region 0,617 0,555 0,575 0,689 0,731 0,791 
Tula region 0,777 0,698 0,732 0,93 0,943 0,871 
Udmurtian Republic 0,655 0,559 0,696 0,925 0,956 0,897 
Ulyanovsk region 0,854 0,719 0,741 0,945 0,965 0,925 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,749 0,615 0,611 0,91 0,921 0,894 
Yaroslavl region 0,585 0,497 0,559 0,863 0,905 0,831 
 
Table  B9.  Malmquist indexes: technical efficiency, pure efficiency and total factor productivity change, 2007-2009  
 Federation subjectы effch2008 effch2009 pech2008 pech2009 tfpch2008 tfpch2009 
Astrakhan region 0,711 1,139 0,984 1,033 1,086 1,097 
Belgorod region 0,851 0,922 0,991 0,87 1,027 1,045 
Bryansk region 0,844 1,047 0,973 0,954 1,165 1,104 
Vladimir region 0,968 1,044 1,002 1 1,364 1,089 
Volgograd region 0,786 0,913 1,042 0,938 1,139 0,949 
Vologda region 0,826 1,07 0,97 0,931 1,051 1,153 
Voronezh region 0,85 0,994 1,044 0,986 1,177 1,057 
the City of Moscow 0,768 0,974 1 1 1,005 1,045 
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thr City of Saint-
Petersburg 0,78 0,946 1 0,976 0,96 1,042 
Ivanovo region 1,016 1,009 1,062 0,944 1,391 1,066 
Kaliningrad region 
1 1 1 1 1,334 1,087 
Kaluga region 1,048 0,889 1,134 0,889 1,304 0,959 
Kirov region 0,653 0,93 1,003 0,902 1,089 0,911 
Kostroma region 0,737 1,182 1,013 0,926 1,192 1,172 
Kurgan region 0,911 0,923 0,898 0,929 1,093 1,01 
Kursk region 0,7 0,992 0,956 0,846 1,156 0,908 
Leningrad region 0,926 0,968 0,929 1,013 1,231 1,079 
Lipetsk region 0,857 1,226 1,024 1,004 1,262 1,184 
Moscow region 1,002 0,949 1,026 1 1,404 0,979 
Nizhnij Novgorod region 
0,845 1,406 1,092 1,155 1,239 1,378 
Novrorod region 0,755 0,985 1,071 0,922 1,099 1,051 
Novosibirsk region 
0,787 1,104 1,069 0,999 1,17 1,101 
Omsk region 0,958 1,036 1,128 0,987 1,305 1,094 
Orenburg region 0,86 0,936 1,094 0,936 1,187 0,994 
Oryol region 0,755 1,068 0,97 0,931 1,083 1,125 
Penza region 0,913 1,123 1 1 1,104 1,215 
Pskov region 1,091 0,904 1,115 0,9 1,336 1,003 
Republic of Bashkortostan 
1,023 0,935 1,087 0,898 1,302 1 
Republic of Kalmykia 0,683 0,962 0,97 0,972 1,011 1,023 
Republic of Marij El 0,901 1,192 1,105 0,981 1,459 1,091 
Republic of Mordovia 0,73 0,914 1 0,96 1,047 0,974 
Republic of Tatarstan 1 0,963 1 1 1,522 0,918 
Rostov region 1 0,882 1 0,908 1,206 0,965 
Ryazan region 0,603 0,96 1,076 0,859 0,963 0,988 
Samara region 0,954 0,989 1,037 0,904 1,142 1,076 
Saratov region 0,683 0,978 0,963 0,899 1,005 1,009 
Sverdlovsk region 0,85 1,11 0,931 0,961 1,02 1,206 
Smolensk region 0,528 1,384 0,836 0,957 0,881 1,267 
Tambov region 0,933 1,006 1,045 0,949 1,328 1,006 
Tver region 0,9 1,036 1,06 1,083 1,194 1,141 
Tula region 0,899 1,049 1,014 0,924 1,09 1,148 
Udmurtian Republic 0,852 1,245 1,034 0,938 1,404 1,14 
Ulyanovsk region 0,842 1,03 1,021 0,958 1,066 1,112 
Chuvashi  Republic 0,821 0,993 1,011 0,971 1,152 1,055 
Yaroslavl region 0,849 1,126 1,049 0,918 1,33 1,03 
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